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Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Thu Jun 13, 2019 11:43 am
by Jonathan Nitzan
Ikonoclast writes:

“Marx’s Refusal of the Labour Theory of Value” by David Harvey.

This is the best short essay on, Marx's so-called "Labor Theory of Value" or really his "Value Theory of Labor" which I have ever read.

I’m not sure I share your enthusiasm for Harvey’s paper. As I read it, the piece insists on holding both ends of the stick. It argues that Marx’s did not have – or rejected the possibility of – a labour theory of value. But it also posits that labour values, although slippery and ever-changing, not only exist, but also continue to rule capitalism in occult ways that only dialectical experts can see.


Many of the arguments made in this thread reiterate claims we have dealt with in our 2009 book Capital as Power, so I won’t elaborate on them further.

Instead, I will conclude with a few paragraphs we have written on Marxist attempts to save Marx from his science:

The notion that Marx was concerned with the qualitative rather than quantitative aspects of capitalism seems to us apologetic and unfounded. More significantly, in our view the belief that his theory of capitalism – or any theory of capitalism for that matter – could be fractured into two independent subsets leads to a dead end.

Begin with the issue of Marx’s emphasis. His work was certainly a critique of capitalist ideology. But it was much more than that. Marx tried to create an alternative science, a framework that could replace both bourgeois political economy and the positivist social management of Auguste Comte. This scheme stood on two main foundations. One was a dialectical history that provided the basis for revolutionary consciousness. The other was a value theory that broke the front window of prices and offered a starting point for future democratic planning.

Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2009. Capital as Power. A Study of Order and Creorder. RIPE Series in Global Political Economy. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 121-122 (

The starting point is valuation. Because capitalism is a system of commodities, and because commodities – and the social groups behind them – are related through prices, any general theory of capitalism must rest on a theory of value. Marx based his own theory of value on labour time – and more specifically, on socially necessary abstract labour time. The exchange value of commodities, he said, depends on the average productive labour needed to make them (the socially necessary aspect), and this socially necessary labour, he continued, can be measured in universal (read abstract) units. In this way, the labour of productive workers, properly socialized and abstracted, becomes the elementary particle on which the entire logic of capitalism rests.

This quantitative aspect of the theory – i.e., its reliance on the magnitude of socially necessary abstract labour time – is the heart and centre of Marx’s scientific socialism. Marx claimed his theory to be superior to the bourgeois alternatives, partly because it did something they couldn’t: it objectively derived the rate of profit – the quantitative compass of capitalism – from the material conditions of the labour process. Prices of production, he wrote, ‘are conditioned on the existence of an average rate of profit’, which itself ‘must be deduced out of the values of commodities. . . . Without such a deduction, an average rate of profit (and consequently a price of production of commodities), remains a vague and senseless conception’ (Marx 1909, Vol. 3, pp. 185-86). The very same point was reiterated by Engels. ‘These two great discoveries’, he wrote, ‘the materialistic conception of history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production through surplus value, we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism became a science. The next thing was to work out all its details and relations’ (Engels 1966, Section I).

Bichler, Shimshon, Jonathan Nitzan, and Tim Di Muzio. 2012. The 1%, Exploitation and Wealth: Tim Di Muzio interviews Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan. Review of Capital as Power 1 (1): 9-10 (

The fact that Marx erred in trying to anchor prices specifically and somewhat mechanically in labour values is secondary. It certainly requires no cover-up or apology. Many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century physicists now seem dated, if not irrelevant. Yet, without their breakthroughs physics would not be where it is today. The same is true for Marx’s labour theory of value. It was the first theory to put the study of society on a systematic footing. Had it not been for the stifling influence of the Soviet Union, the spirit of that theory would likely have kept Marxism a vibrant science.

Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2009. Capital as Power. A Study of Order and Creorder. RIPE Series in Global Political Economy. New York and London: Routledge, p. 123. (

Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Sun Jun 16, 2019 2:06 pm
by uma
Ikonoclast wrote:That is to say, the SNALT is not put forward by Marx himself as a universal quantum. It is not asserted as true for all societies in all epochs. Rather, it is asserted as true, to at least a first-order approximation, in the historical epoch of early capitalism.

This is not true in Capital and it cannot be true for the LVT to hold.

That Marx intends LVT to hold at least for any commodity, he makes explicit in the Aristotle passage:

The brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality. (My emphasis)

Aristotle was "prevented from discovering" of something that must have been there already, since Aristotle reasons about price and commodity exchange.

And Marx's theory must be timeless. Consider it was different. Then prices would have different causes depending on their mode of production. Marx would need as many theories of prices as there are such modes. And he would need theories of "price generator interactions" if the same commodity produced by different modes come together at the same market. (Quite a lot: if there are four modes of production, wage labor, slavery, feudalism, and self-employment, you would need a theory for the interaction of each pair (3 * 2 * 1 = 6), each triplet (4) and all 4 together (1): 11 interaction theories). In Marx time there was, e.g. cotton produced by wage labor (say in India), feudalist production (also India), slavery (USA), self employed families (assuming Egypt) but Marx never envisages that there may be different causes of the prices.

The validity (and beauty) of Marx' LVT concept rests on its universality across societies and time for any kind of commodity exchange, and including labor WHEN commodified as wage labor.

For a thorough critique of Marx' take on Aristotle see Castoriadis, "Value, Equality, Justice, Politics: From Marx to Aristotle, and from Aristotle to Ourselves", in: Crossroads in the Labyrinth, 1984.

Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Sun Jun 16, 2019 2:59 pm
by uma
Jonathan Nitzan wrote:
Marx was a considerably more intelligent and subtle thinker than his more dogmatic followers.
The pitfalls include, among others: ongoing changes in technology and workers’ subsistence; the arbitrary division between productive and unproductive labour; the prevalence of joint production; and the inability to compute the SNALT contents of constant capital without the quantification of use value (‘productivity’).
Each of these factors seriously undermines the existence of SNALT, even as a central tendency.

When rereading Capital I find that Marx commits a dozen or so argumentative blunders at the first few pages of the main body of the work, but the greatest one is perhaps this one (ch. 1 sec. 2):

A commodity may be the product of the most skilled labour, but its value, by equating it to the product of simple unskilled labour, represents a definite quantity of the latter labour alone. The different proportions in which different sorts of labour are reduced to unskilled labour as their standard, are established by a social process that goes on behind the backs of the producers, and, consequently, appear to be fixed by custom. For simplicity’s sake we shall henceforth account every kind of labour to be unskilled, simple labour; by this we do no more than save ourselves the trouble of making the reduction.

Thus it it clear to Marx that there is something he would have to show: How to "reduce" complex ("skilled" in the translation) work to simple ("unskilled") one. Yet he never dares to give even a minimal hint of how this could be done -- and there are several hundreds of pages to go. And this only to "save the trouble" "for simplicity's sake"! - You would not get your freshman term paper in logics through with such a statement...

One of the problems of Marx is that he misrepresents the math example he himself gives (sec. 1):

A simple geometrical illustration will make this clear. In order to calculate and compare the areas of rectilinear figures, we decompose them into triangles. But the area of the triangle itself is expressed by something totally different from its visible figure, namely, by half the product of the base multiplied by the altitude. In the same way the exchange values of commodities must be capable of being expressed in terms of something common to them all, of which thing they represent a greater or less quantity.

To a mathematician to call the calculation of the areas of triangles a "reduction" to something "common to them all" would already sound strange. One would rather say that the mathematician has a certain procedure to compute some mathematical object, a number, the area, from another mathematical object, a triangle.

Apparently, Marx did not understand that, in order to do the same as the mathematicians, or, indeed, any scientist, he would have to show us a reproducible procedure of how to perform the various "reductions" he proposes. You can read Capital but you will never find procedures for the various distinctions (like "productive" vs "unproductive" labor), or "reductions" (like from "complex" to "simple" labor). Marxists up until today do not understand this: in a popular introduction to Marx' work Michael Heinrich (a mathematician by education...) says that it is not a problem that labor values cannot be observed since physicists cannot observe gravitational fields either; Heinrich does not understand that they can compute them from observations whereas Marxist cannot do the same for labor values.

It would be interesting how much Marx actually troubled himself about the problem of reducing complex to simple labor. According to Capital as Power there is not much in the literature or in the works of Marx published. Maybe there is more in "MEGA" the Gesamtausgabe...

Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Sun Jun 16, 2019 6:47 pm
by blairfix
Well put, Ulf.

I've often felt that Marxists really ought to read about the philosophy of science. It's no good having Grand Theory that makes very specific pronouncements but leaves out all the intermediate steps. Marx definitely fell into this trap.

Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Mon Jun 17, 2019 2:03 am
by uma
blairfix wrote:I've often felt that Marxists really ought to read about the philosophy of science. It's no good having Grand Theory that makes very specific pronouncements but leaves out all the intermediate steps. Marx definitely fell into this trap.

Not only Marxists suffer from this. Mainstream economists do too, as your conversation with one of them shows, and it is a much broader phenomenon in conversation, not restricted to economics.

The philosophy in case is more analytical philosophy, or "philosophy done right" as Peter Bieri observes. It is really very simple: a concept denotes a distinction; distinctions are actions; a word represents or signifies a concept in a sentence; in order to explain a concept you show how the word denoting it is supposed to be used by performing the action and use the word with it (so words and actions go together like in games or stage plays, which is why Wittgenstein calls it "language game"). So, if Marx wants to explain the reduction of complex to simple work he would have to explain the word "reduction" and that is, in this case, to show how to do it (or how the commodity exchange does it for you).

Marxists seem to have particular problems with Wittgenstein. For those who cannot stand Wittgenstein (and it is indeed sometimes difficult to extract the systematic aspect of the Philosophical Investigations without something like Hacker's Analytical Commentary) I recommend Ernst Tugendhat (1982), Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language, CUP. Unlike other introductions of his time, Tugendhat introduces analytical philosophy by showing how fundamental questions of traditional philosophy can be dealt with it, thus positioning it in the broader context and history of philosophy. He also performs analytical philosophy as he introduces it, if sometimes rather painstakingly accurate and dry (he is a German professor...), so you get to see how to do it.

Back to economics. One of the most the most honest "marginalists" was Ludwig von Mises, one of the pioneers of this branch of economics. He is nowadays considered to belong to the "Austrian school" which in turn is considered "heterodox" even though the marginalist premises are the same as in mainstream. Why heterodox? Von Mises in his opus magnum Human Action is explicit that it is not an empirical theory of human action but an ideal theory of how people should act if they were to act "rationally" (i.e. like homini economici). Von Mises is also explicitly saying that most of actual observable human action, and hence prices, are "irrational" and not subject to economic analysis. But ordinary economists want to be empirical scientists dealing with actual reality so the information that their foundation is merely an ideal is a no-go. This is why "Austrians" are "heterodox"....

Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Fri Jul 12, 2019 6:45 am
by wayburn
What we really need, instead of money as we know it, is more like rationing than it is like salaries or profits earned. Suppose we have already established the necessity for equality in standards of living. Then, it is necessary for each economic actor in the community to consume as little emergy, fresh water,and human labor exerted by others as possible - but, in any case, no more than 1/Nth of the sustainable community dividend - while utilizing no more than 1/Nth of the land not reserved for the community in common for working, living, and other personal activities.

Note [a word on land]. Suppose we have agreed that all values must be established by invariant physical measures. That is, if no such theoretical value can be established (independent of what anyone thinks, desires, or believes), then we must agree that that economic entity may not be consumed or assigned permanently to anyone. In short, it may not be bought and sold even in an old-fashioned economy in which buying and selling is still carried on. This discussion applies to land. It is easy to find a suitable measure for the value of land for a unit of area and a unit of time. This would be the insolation (energy per unit area absorbed from the sun per unit time). But, there is no useful measure that can be applied to land for utilization in perpetuity. (Infinity is not a useful value.) Perhaps, we have here a germ of an argument against most private property even though the contents of our household should be assigned their emergy, water, and labor values. It seems that, after food and clothing, our households will receive most of our rations. (As described elsewhere, most of our current forms of employment will need to be eliminated and some of our highest paid workers in today's economy will need to be furloughed. We must be able to afford their support at equal standards of living to everyone else but certainly not greater regardless of what they were previously. I am most anxious to discuss this on a theoretical basis but not on the basis that it is unheard of or that no one will accept it.

It is now the middle of the night and I must rest before I write a second draft of the above which has a number of rough passages.

Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Mon Dec 30, 2019 10:49 am
by uma
blairfix wrote:I've often felt that Marxists really ought to read about the philosophy of science. It's no good having Grand Theory that makes very specific pronouncements but leaves out all the intermediate steps. Marx definitely fell into this trap.

Leszek Kolakowski shared this view long ago. Here are some quotes from his review of Althusser. But the same applies to more recent Marxists as well (e.g. Heinrich).

Moreover, Althusser seems to believe that this concept of "structure" is especially important in the struggle against what he calls "empiricist ideology". Empiricism means, according to him a certain theory of knowledge which claims that knowing consists in extracting from the real object a pre-existing "essence" included into and blurred by external appearances. The sole example of this "empiricism" which Althusser quotes is the famous comment of Michaelangelo on a statue which is hidden but ready inside the stone. But he believes that such empiricism constitutes the proper content of the epistemology of Locke and Condillac. The reader with an elementary knowledge of the history of philosophy will notice at once that what Althusser means by "empiricism", could well be considered as the Aristotelian or Thomist theory of abstraction but that modern empiricism -- beginning not with Locke but at least with fourteenth century nominalists -- exactly the opposite of this idea. Empiricism in the only sense in which it has been used in the history of philosophy precisely denies the concept that abstraction consists in extracting a "universale in re" or a "formal essence lodged within the object itself," and to attribute this Aristotelian theory to Locke and to contemporary "empiricists" (without saying who falls under this category) proves only yet again the author's historical sloppines.

He [Althusser] insists, moreover, that knowledge -- in defiance of "empiricist" ideology -- has nothing to do with pure, immediate, singular objects, but always with abstractions which are already elaborated and conceptualized. He fails to remember that this discovery was made long ago and that the criticism of the seventeenth century theory of abstraction (concepts as the generalization of an immediate given, raw and unprejudged perception) was made so many times that it became a commonplace in contemporary philosophy of science. Not to speak of contemporary philosophers such as Popper, who have devoted a good deal of their analysis to this problem, this denial of a "raw perception" as a starting point for scientific theories was not simply stated generally, but seriously justified in analyses of scientific procedures -- by many "positivist" philosophers and scientists from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, among them well-known French authors such as Poincaré and Duhem.

Marx's statement about the anatomy of the ape ["the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of the ape"] (apparently not accurate from the strictly anatomical point of view) is precisely the principle of the teleological understanding of history. If we can understand past forms through their future results, we look at them as they would be in the future, i.e. from the standpoint of what they promise. The genetic explanation does not require this finalist concept, it being satisfied with stating how a certain structure arose from an earlier one and without assuming that this earlier structure somehow tended towards its contemporary form. Moreover, while the genetic explanation does not involve the teleological one, the teleological one, its turn, involves the genetic. If we are allowed to understand past forms in the light of later ones we are also allowed to seek in the past the "germs" of the present. In reality, the question of whether or not the knowledge of genesis is indispensable in understanding the "structure" is wrongly put. It simply depends on what we are asking. There are many questions which we can try to answer without genetic enquiry and many others which require a genetic explanation.

I am far from being a follower of Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy. However, while reading some dialectical philosophers (Althusser is an example) I do find myself regretting their lack of any training in this philosophy and consequently of any logical discipline. Such a training would help them to understand the simple difference between "saying" something and "proving" it (Althusser often formulates a general statement and then quotes it later and then refers to it by saying "we showed" or "it was proved"), between a necessary and a sufficient condition, between a law and a statement of fact, etc. It would permit them, too, to know what the analysis of concepts means. These two books of Althusser provide a disagreeable example of empty verbosity which, as noted earlier, can be reduced either to common sense trivialities in new verbal disguise, or to traditional Marxist tenets repeated with no additional explanation, or to wrong historical judgements. In understanding Marx, or Hegel, or political economy, or the methods of social science, they give us nothing except pretentious language. They teach us only about Althusser and may be useful to someone interested in this subject.

Kolakowski, Leszek, 1971, Althusser's Marx, in: The Socialist Register, vol. 8, p. 111-128. Here from pages 124 to 126.

Kolakowski is the author of a large book on the history of Marxism, Main currents of Marxism (1976). Kolakowski was pointed to me by Daniel Moure.

Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Wed Jan 08, 2020 5:25 am
by uma
Having read the three volumes now, I can very much recommend Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Apart from its stylistic excellence as the author "distills thought until he can state it in broad terms and accessible language and with almost no qualifiers" (to quote Daniel) this is your one-stop reading about all of Marxism from "The Founders" (vol. 1: Marx, Engels), via "The Golden Age" (vol. 2: Socialism until WW1, Leninism), to "The Breakdown" (vol. 3: Stalinism, post-WW2 Western Marxism, New Left, Maoism). The author shows no sympathy with his subject but his summaries are concise and correct (as far as I can judge from having read the same sources) and his comment follows logically from its premises and is mostly intrinsic. He does not deal with the academic Marxism of our age (the books were conceived in the early 70s) which could be called post-breakdown pseudo-Marxism. Pseudo because reference to Marx by an author seems to be mostly an act of self-positioning as radical and an excuse for not doing proper science (which is "positivist") rather than a take-up of serious aspects of the Marxist doctrine which is practically (and rightly) dead.

Re: Monthly Review cites Fix

PostPosted: Wed Jan 08, 2020 7:30 am
by uma
A summary of Kolakowski's critique of Marxism can be found in his article What is left of socialism, in: First Things, Oct. 2002.

You will note that he holds up the distinction of politics and economics and generally argues from a conservative point of view. But this does not invalidate his criticism of Marxism.